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Economists	used	to	think	that	it	doesn’t	matter
whom	you	tax,	but	it	does
In	most	countries	employers	and	employees	both	contribute	to	the	taxes	(or	social	security	contributions)	levied
on	labour.	Employers	pay	taxes	on	top	of	the	wage	they	transfer	to	employees	and	employees	pay	income	taxes
on	the	money	they	receive	from	employers.	For	many	decades,	economists	thought	that	it	should	not	matter	who
pays.	Employers	were	thought	to	care	only	about	total	labour	costs	(gross	wage	paid	plus	employer	taxes).
Employees	were	thought	to	care	only	about	their	net	wage	(what’s	left	of	the	gross	wage	after	income	tax).	The
gross	wage	itself	should	be	of	interest	to	neither	of	them,	so	it	should	not	matter	who	pays	the	taxes.
In	contrast,	politicians	have	often	argued	about	which	side	of	the	labour	market	ought	to	pay	taxes	and
contributions.	Left-wing	politicians	thereby	tend	to	favour	levying	taxes	on	employers	while	right-wing	politicians
tend	to	favour	employee-side	duties.
We	show	in	a	recent	research	article	that	it	does	matter	who	pays.	By	using	a	laboratory	experiment	to	study	how
people	actually	respond	to	taxes	on	labour,	we	are	able	to	show	that	people	react	differently,	depending	on	where
the	taxes	are	paid.	This	directly	contradicts	traditional	economic	reasoning.
To	illustrate	traditional	thinking,	consider	the	following	graph.
Figure	1.	Wages	and	taxes	
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The	employer	is	thought	to	be	only	interested	in	her	own	costs,	which	are	given	by	the	aggregate	labour	costs.
The	employee	is	assumed	to	only	care	about	how	much	income	she	will	have	left	to	spend	(given	by	her	net
income).	Neither	cares	about	how	the	taxes	paid	are	split	between	them.
In	our	experiment,	we	organise	a	labour	market	with	employers	and	employees.	Employees	supply	labour	to	do	a
task	for	which	the	employer	pays	them.	Employers	make	money	based	on	the	tasks	successfully	finished	by	the
employees.	We	tax	both	sides,	but	vary	the	split	of	taxes	between	employer	and	employee,	while	keeping	both
total	labour	costs	and	net	income	constant.	This	experimental	control	is	ideal	to	study	the	differential	reactions	to
the	taxes	and	to	investigate	the	psychological	mechanisms	that	might	cause	these	reactions.
We	are	interested	in	three	ways	in	which	the	changes	in	taxes	might	make	taxpayers	react.	First,	varying	the
extent	to	which	the	taxes	are	levied	at	the	employer	or	employee	side	of	the	market	might	change	opinions	about
government	spending.	Specifically,	we	measure	whether	it	affects	the	level	of	government	spending	that
employees	prefer.	Second,	we	measure	employees’	sense	of	well-being	to	study	whether	the	shifting	of	the	taxes
changes	the	way	employees	feel.	Third,	we	investigate	whether	such	shifts	change	employees’	willingness	to
work.	Our	results	provide	clear	evidence	that	–	despite	what	economists	have	always	thought	–	it	does	matter
who	pays	the	taxes.
First,	people	prefer	more	public	spending	when	employers	pay	the	duties.	Shifting	all	taxes	from	the	employee	to
the	employer	makes	participants	in	the	experiment	want	to	increase	public	spending	by	24	to	55	per	cent,
depending	on	what	the	government	does	with	the	raised	taxes.	This	suggests	that	employees	believe	that	their
own	contribution	to	public	spending	is	lower	when	taxes	are	levied	on	employers	even	if	there	is	de	facto	no
difference	in	the	amount	of	money	that	ends	up	in	their	pockets.
Second,	employees	are	less	happy	when	they	have	to	pay	the	duty	rather	than	their	employer,	even	when	they
are	fully	compensated	by	a	higher	gross	wage.	This	is	only	observed	in	cases	where	tax	proceeds	are	wasted	by
the	government,	which	represents	a	case	of	extreme	government	inefficiency.	Measuring	well-being	on	a	linear
scale	from	4	to	36,	a	shift	of	taxes	from	employees	to	employers	then	increases	the	sense	of	well-being	in	the
experiment	from	almost	19	to	almost	22.	No	effect	on	employee	well-being	is	observed	when	the	government
efficiently	uses	tax	proceeds	to	provide	a	public	good	that	benefits	all.
Third,	we	provide	evidence	that	people	are	more	likely	to	take	up	jobs	when	gross	wages	increase	even	if	net
wages	remain	unchanged.	We	measure	this	by	giving	employees	an	opportunity	to	pay	us	for	a	chance	to	do	the
job	again.	Even	though	we	keep	net	income	constant,	they	are	willing	to	pay	up	to	8%	more	if	they	pay	income
taxes	than	if	taxes	are	levied	on	the	employer	side.	This	suggests	that	people	do	not	fully	account	for	the	taxes
they	have	to	pay	when	they	make	decisions	about	taking	up	jobs	but	instead	base	their	decision	partly	on	the	(for
them)	economically	irrelevant	gross	wage.
In	short,	it	does	matter	who	pays	the	taxes,	because	people	do	not	seem	to	perfectly	understand	taxation.	In	our
paper,	we	discuss	three	psychological	mechanisms	that	help	explain	the	results	we	observe.
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It	is	not	easy	to	draw	specific	policy	implications	from	our	findings.	If	employees’	happiness	is	the	main	goal	of	a
tax	reform,	taxes	should	be	levied	on	employers.	If	it	is	a	policy	maker’s	main	goal	to	increase	the	labour	supply
then	taxes	should	be	levied	on	employees.	As	for	the	level	of	public	spending,	it	is	ambiguous	whether	welfare	is
served	better	by	inducing	a	preference	for	a	larger	or	smaller	public	sector.	What	is	clear	is	that	politicians	can	try
to	use	the	tax	liability	side	as	a	tool	to	induce	preferences	for	a	level	of	public	spending	closer	to	the	one	they
prefer	themselves.	Following	our	results,	politicians	in	favor	of	increasing	public	spending	can	create	support	for
this	view	by	shifting	duties	to	the	employer	side	while	those	favoring	a	smaller	public	sector	would	better	tax	the
employee.
♣♣♣
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